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Abstract
Many recent political events, like the 2016 US Presidential elections or the 2018
Brazilian elections have raised the attention of institutions and of the general public
on the role of Internet and social media in influencing the outcome of these events.
We argue that a safe democracy is one in which citizens have tools to make them
aware of propaganda campaigns. We propose a novel task: performing fine-grained
analysis of texts by detecting all fragments that contain propaganda techniques as
well as their type. We further design a novel multi-granularity neural network, and
we show that it outperforms several strong BERT-based baselines.
1 Introduction
Journalistic organisations, such as Media Bias/Fact Check,1 provide reports on news sources high-
lighting the ones that are propagandistic. Obviously, such analysis is time-consuming and possibly
biased and it cannot be applied to the enormous amount of news that flood social media and the
Internet. Research on detecting propaganda has focused primarily on classifying entire articles as
propagandistic/non-propagandistic [1, 2, 11]. Such learning systems are trained using gold labels
obtained by transferring the label of the media source, as per Media Bias/Fact Check judgment, to
each of its articles. Such distant supervision setting inevitably introduces noise in the learning process
[8] and the resulting systems tend to lack explainability.
We argue that in order to study propaganda in a sound and reliable way, we need to rely on high-
quality trusted professional annotations and it is best to do so at the fragment level, targeting specific
techniques rather than using a label for an entire document or an entire news outlet. Therefore, we
propose a novel task: identifying specific instances of propaganda techniques used within an article.
In particular, we design a novel multi-granularity neural network, and we show that it outperforms
several strong BERT-based baselines.
Our corpus could enable research in propagandistic and non-objective news, including the develop-
ment of explainable AI systems. A system that can detect instances of use of specific propagandistic
techniques would be able to make it explicit to the users why a given article was predicted to be
propagandistic. It could also help train the users to spot the use of such techniques in the news.
1http://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
AI for Social Good workshop at NeurIPS (2019), Vancouver, Canada.
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2 Corpus Annotated with Propaganda Techniques
We retrieved 451 news articles from 48 news outlets, both propagandistic and non-propagandistic
according to Media Bias/Fact Check, which professionals annotators2 annotated according to eighteen
persuasion techniques [9], ranging from leveraging on the emotions of the audience —such as using
loaded language or appeal to authority [6] and slogans [4]— to using logical fallacies —such as straw
men [12] (misrepresenting someone’s opinion), hidden ad-hominem fallacies, and red herring [13,
p. 78] (presenting irrelevant data).3 Some of these techniques weren studied in tasks such as hate
speech detection and computational argumentation [7].
The total number of technique instances found in the articles, after the consolidation phase, is
7, 485, out of a total number of 21, 230 sentences (35.2%). The distribution of the techniques in
the corpus is also uneven: while there are 2, 547 occurrences of loaded language, there are only 15
instances of straw man (more statistics about the corpus can be found in [3]). We define two tasks
based on the corpus described in Section 2: (i) SLC (Sentence-level Classification), which asks to
predict whether a sentence contains at least one propaganda technique, and (ii) FLC (Fragment-level
classification), which asks to identify both the spans and the type of propaganda technique. Note
that these two tasks are of different granularity, g1 and g2, namely tokens for FLC and sentences for
SLC. We split the corpus into training, development and test, each containing 293, 57, 101 articles
and 14,857, 2,108, 4,265 sentences, respectively.
Our task requires specific evaluation measures that give credit for partial overlaps of fragments. Thus,
in our precision and recall versions, we give partial credit to imperfect matches at the character level,
as in plagiarism detection [10].
Let s and t be two fragments, i.e., sequences of characters. We measure the overlap of two annotated
fragments as C(s, t, h) = |(s∩t)|h δ (l(s), l(t)), where h is a normalizing factor, l(a) is the labelling of
fragment a, and δ(a, b) = 1 if a = b, and 0 otherwise.
We now define variants of precision and recall able to account for the imbalance in the corpus:
P (S, T ) =
1
|S|
∑
s ∈ S,
t ∈ T
C(s, t, |s|), R(S, T ) = 1|T |
∑
s ∈ S,
t ∈ T
C(s, t, |t|), (1)
In eq. (1), we define P (S, T ) to be zero if |S| = 0 and R(S, T ) to be zero if |T | = 0. Finally, we
compute the harmonic mean of precision and recall in Eq. (1) and we obtain an F1-measure. Having
a separate function C for comparing two annotations gives us additional flexibility compared to
standard NER measures that operate at the token/character level, e.g., we can change the factor that
gives credit for partial overlaps and be more forgiving when only a few characters are wrong.
3 Models
We depart from BERT [5], and we design three baselines.
BERT. We add a linear layer on top of BERT and we fine-tune it, as suggested in [5]. For the FLC
task, we feed the final hidden representation for each token to a layer Lg2 that makes a 19-way
classification: does this token belong to one of the eighteen propaganda techniques or to none of them
(cf. Figure 1-a). For the SLC task, we feed the final hidden representation for the special [CLS]
token, which BERT uses to represent the full sentence, to a two-dimensional layer Lg1 to make a
binary classification.
BERT-Joint. We use the layers for both tasks in the BERT baseline, Lg1 and Lg2 , and we train for
both FLC and SLC jointly (cf. Figure 1-b).
BERT-Granularity. We modify BERT-Joint to transfer information from SLC directly to FLC.
Instead of using only the Lg2 layer for FLC, we concatenate Lg1 and Lg2 , and we add an extra
19-dimensional classification layer Lg1,2 on top of that concatenation to perform the prediction for
FLC (cf. Figure 1-c).
2http://www.aiidatapro.com. The company performs professional annotations in the NLP domain,
although they were not expert in propaganda techniques before this work.
3For a complete list see http://propaganda.qcri.org/annotations/definitions.html
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Figure 1: The architecture of the baseline models (a-c), and of our multi-granularity network (d).
Multi-Granularity Network. We propose a model that can drive the higher-granularity task (FLC)
on the basis of the lower-granularity information (SLC), rather than simply using low-granularity
information directly. Figure 1-d shows the architecture of this model.
More generally, suppose there are k tasks of increasing granularity, e.g., document-level, paragraph-
level, sentence-level, word-level, subword-level, character-level. Each task has a separate classifica-
tion layer Lgk that receives the feature representation of the specific level of granularity gk and outputs
ogk . The dimension of the representation depends on the embedding layer, while the dimension of
the output depends on the number of classes in the task. The output ogk is used to generate a weight
for the next granularity task gk+1 through a trainable gate f :
wgk = f(ogk) (2)
The gate f consists of a projection layer to one dimension and an activation function. The resulting
weight is multiplied by each element of the output of layer Lgk+1 to produce the output for task gk+1:
ogk+1 = wgk ∗ ogk+1 (3)
If wgk = 0 for a given example, the output of the next granularity task ogk+1 would be 0 as well. In
our setting, this means that, if the sentence-level classifier is confident that the sentence does not
contain propaganda, i.e., wgk = 0, then ogk+1 = 0 and there would be no propagandistic technique
predicted for any span within that sentence. Similarly, when back-propagating the error, if wgk = 0
for a given example, the final entropy loss would become zero, i.e., the model would not get any
information from that example. As a result, only examples strongly classified as negative in a
lower-granularity task would be ignored in the high-granularity task. Having the lower-granularity
as the main task means that higher-granularity information can be selectively used as additional
information to improve the performance, but only if the example is not considered as highly negative.
For the loss function, we use a cross-entropy loss with sigmoid activation for every layer, except for
the highest-granularity layer LgK , which uses a cross-entropy loss with softmax activation. Unlike
softmax, which normalizes over all dimensions, the sigmoid allows each output component of layer
Lgk to be independent from the rest. Thus, the output of the sigmoid for the positive class increases
the degree of freedom by not affecting the negative class, and vice versa. As we have two tasks, we
use sigmoid activation for Lg1 and softmax activation for Lg2 . Moreover, we use a weighted sum of
losses with a hyper-parameter α:
LJ = Lg1 ∗ α+ Lg2 ∗ (1− α) (4)
Again, we use BERT [5] for the contextualized embedding layer and we place the multi-granularity
network on top of it.
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Model Task SLC Task FLCP R F1 P R F1
All-Propaganda 23.92 100.0 38.61 - - -
BERT 63.20 53.16 57.74 21.48 21.39 21.39
Joint 62.84 55.46 58.91 20.11 19.74 19.92
Granu 62.80 55.24 58.76 23.85 20.14 21.80
Multi-Granularity
ReLU 60.41 61.58 60.98 23.98 20.33 21.82
Sigmoid 62.27 59.56 60.71 24.42 21.05 22.58
Table 1: Sentence-level (left) and fragment-level experiments (right). All-propaganda is a baseline
that always output the propaganda class.
4 Experiments and Evaluation
We used the PyTorch4 framework and the pretrained BERT model,5 which we fine-tuned for our
tasks.6 To deal with class imbalance, we give weight to the binary cross-entropy according to
the proportion of positive samples. For the α in the joint loss function, we use 0.9 for sentence
classification, and 0.1 for word-level classification. In order to reduce the effect of random fluctuations
for BERT, all the reported numbers are the average of three experimental runs with different random
seeds. As it is standard, we tune our models on the dev partition and we report results on the test
partition.
The left side of Table 1 shows the performance for the three baselines and for our multi-granularity
network on the FLC task. For the latter, we vary the degree to which the gate function is applied:
using ReLU is more aggressive compared to using the Sigmoid, as the ReLU outputs zero for a
negative input. Table 1 (right) shows that using additional information from the sentence-level for
the token-level classification (BERT-Granularity) yields small improvements. The multi-granularity
models outperform all baselines thanks to their higher precision. This shows the effect of the model
excluding sentences that it determined to be non-propagandistic from being considered for token-level
classification.
The right side of Table 1 shows the results for the SLC task. We apply our multi-granularity network
model to the sentence-level classification task to see its effect on low granularity when we train the
model with a high granularity task. Interestingly, it yields huge performance improvements on the
sentence-level classification result. Compared to the BERT baseline, it increases the recall by 8.42%,
resulting in a 3.24% increase of the F1 score. In this case, the result of token-level classification is
used as additional information for the sentence-level task, and it helps to find more positive samples.
This shows the opposite effect of our model compared to the FLC task.
5 Conclusions
We have argued for a new way to study propaganda in news media: by focusing on identifying the
instances of use of specific propaganda techniques. Going at this fine-grained level can yield more
reliable systems and it also makes it possible to explain to the user why an article was judged as
propagandistic by an automatic system.
We experimented with a number of BERT-based models and devised a novel architecture which
outperforms standard BERT-based baselines. Our fine-grained task can complement document-level
judgments, both to come out with an aggregated decision and to explain why a document —or an
entire news outlet— has been flagged as potentially propagandistic by an automatic system.
In future work, we plan to include more media sources, especially from non-English-speaking media
and regions. We further want to extend the tool to support other propaganda techniques.
4http://pytorch.org
5http://github.com/huggingface/pytorch-pretrained-BERT
6Our source code together with the dataset are available in GitHub: http://anonymous.for.review.
4
6 Acknowledgements
This research is part of the Propaganda Analysis Project,7 which is framed within the Tanbih project.8
The Tanbih project aims to limit the effect of “fake news”, propaganda, and media bias by making
users aware of what they are reading, thus promoting media literacy and critical thinking. The project
is developed in collaboration between the Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI), HBKU and
the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL).
References
[1] A. Barrón-Cedeño, G. Da San Martino, I. Jaradat, and P. Nakov. Proppy: A system to unmask
propaganda in online news. In Proceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI ’19, pages 9847–9848, Honolulu, HI, USA, 2019.
[2] A. Barrón-Cedeno, I. Jaradat, G. Da San Martino, and P. Nakov. Proppy: Organizing the news
based on their propagandistic content. Information Processing & Management, 56(5):1849–
1864, 2019.
[3] G. Da San Martino, S. Yu, A. Barrón-Cedeño, R. Petrov, and P. Nakov. Fine-grained analysis
of propaganda in news articles. In Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods
in Natural Language Processing and 9th International Joint Conference on Natural Language
Processing, EMNLP-IJCNLP 2019, pages 5640–5650, Hong Kong, China, 2019.
[4] L. Dan. Techniques for the Translation of Advertising Slogans. In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Conference Literature, Discourse and Multicultural Dialogue, LDMD ’15, pages 13–23,
Mures, Romania, 2015.
[5] J. Devlin, M.-W. Chang, K. Lee, and K. Toutanova. BERT: Pre-training of deep bidirectional
transformers for language understanding. In Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the
North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language
Technologies, NAACL-HLT ’19, pages 4171–4186, Minneapolis, MN, USA, 2019.
[6] J. Goodwin. Accounting for the force of the appeal to authority. In Proceedings of the 9th
International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, OSSA ’11,
pages 1–9, Ontario, Canada, 2011.
[7] I. Habernal, H. Wachsmuth, I. Gurevych, and B. Stein. Before name-calling: Dynamics and
triggers of ad hominem fallacies in web argumentation. In Proceedings of the 2018 Conference
of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human
Language Technologies, NAACL-HLT ’18, pages 386–396, New Orleans, LA, USA, 2018.
[8] B. D. Horne, S. Khedr, and S. Adali. Sampling the news producers: A large news and feature data
set for the study of the complex media landscape. In Proceedings of the Twelfth International
AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, ICWSM ’18, Stanford, CA, USA, 2018.
[9] C. R. Miller. The Techniques of Propaganda. From “How to Detect and Analyze Propaganda,”
an address given at Town Hall, 1939. The Center for learning.
[10] M. Potthast, B. Stein, A. Barrón-Cedeño, and P. Rosso. An evaluation framework for plagiarism
detection. In Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on computational linguistics:
Posters, COLING ’10, pages 997–1005, Beijing, China, 2010.
[11] H. Rashkin, E. Choi, J. Y. Jang, S. Volkova, and Y. Choi. Truth of varying shades: Analyzing
language in fake news and political fact-checking. In Proceedings of the 2017 Conference on Em-
pirical Methods in Natural Language Processing, EMNLP ’17, pages 2931–2937, Copenhagen,
Denmark, 2017.
[12] D. Walton. The straw man fallacy. Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1996.
[13] A. Weston. A rulebook for arguments. Hackett Publishing, 2018.
7http://propaganda.qcri.org
8http://tanbih.qcri.org
5
